周文慧，華南理工大學教授国民娱乐、博導国民娱乐、院長助理国民娱乐。2019年入選國家自然科學基金委杰青国民娱乐，2017年入選珠江學者特聘教授国民娱乐，2012年入選教育部新世紀優秀人才，2010年入選廣東省高等學校“千百十工程”。主要研究方向包括收益管理、質量管理、綠色供應鏈管理、服務運作管理，在Production and Operations Management、Decision Sciences、European Journal of Operational Research、Computers & Industrial Engineering国民娱乐、Naval Research Logistics、管理科學學報等國際與國內知名期刊上發表多篇論文。主持5項國家自然科學基金項目，其中重點項目1項国民娱乐。
報告內容簡介（Abstract）：We consider a mixed duopoly service system with two service providers (SPs): one is public, and the other is private. The public SP’s goal is welfare maximization, whereas the private SP is profit driven. The two SPs’ services differ in quality, and customers are heterogeneous in terms of their quality tastes. We first consider the setting in which the private SP provides a premium service and the public SP provides a regular one. We find that interestingly, although the public SP’s goal is welfare maximization, the whole system’s welfare can be worse than that of the system with only profit-seeking private SPs. We further find that the system’s welfare can be maximized by partially privatizing the public SP, that is, changing its goal to be a level between welfare and profit maximization. In some cases, such as when the service capacity of the public SP is very small, full privatization of the public SP generates the highest social welfare for the whole system. We then check the symmetric setting in which the public SP provides a premium service and the private SP provides a regular one and obtain similar findings.
關旭，華中科技大學教授、博導国民娱乐，2019年入選國家自然科學基金委優青国民娱乐。研究興趣主要是信息不對稱環境下的供應鏈管理。近5年來在Production and Operations Management, Journal of Retailing, Naval Research Logistics，Decision Sciences等國際權威SCI/SSCI檢索期刊發表論文20余篇。主持國家自然科學優秀青年基金/面上/青年基金，教育部人文社科規劃與青年基金，中國博士后面上與特別資助基金等多項科研項目等多項。
報告內容簡介（Abstract）：This paper investigates the supplier’s voluntary disclosure strategy when he can encroach on the retailer’s operations by selling directly to final consumers. The establishment of direct channel expands the market potential, induces the supplier to adopt disclosure strategy more frequently, and finally leads to a higher level of information transparency in the supply chain. This enhanced level of information transparency, however, can exert adverse impacts on the retailer’s and supplier’s profitability. Since more quality information is revealed in the presence of dual-channel, the retailer is able to free ride on the supplier’s disclosure to enhance the consumer’s quality expectation. In most cases, such a free-riding effect is positive and can even create a higher ex-ante payoff for the retailer in face of the supplier’s encroachment. Differently, more transparent quality information does not necessarily benefit the supplier, as the supplier can no longer hide those negative quality information to the consumers due to the change of channel structure. Thus, we show that the supplier’s ex-ante payoff may become lower with encroachment and the supplier would commit not to encroach on the retail market, even though he is endowing with a free option to open the direct selling channel.
田林，復旦大學管理學院副教授、博導，2019年入選國家自然科學基金委優青。研究領域為平臺模式下的運營優化和營銷決策問題，涉及共享平臺国民娱乐、電商平臺国民娱乐、在線服務平臺等。研究成果發表在Management Science、Marketing Science、Journal of Marketing Research、Production and Operations Management、管理科學學報、營銷科學學報等運營管理和市場營銷領域國際與國內知名期刊，參與過華住酒店集團、上海煙草集團、中國東方航空、思科中國等多個企業項目。
報告內容簡介（Abstract）：Mobile communications technologies and online platforms have enabled large-scale consumer-to-consumer (C2C) sharing of their under-utilized products. A product owner’s self-use values can differ over time, and in a period of low self-use value, the consumer may rent out her product in a product-sharing market. In response to consumer-to-consumer product sharing, many manufacturers (e.g., General Motors, BMW) have entered the product-sharing market to provide their own rental services in addition to outright sales to consumers. This paper develops an analytical framework to study a manufacturer’s optimal entry strategy in the product-sharing market and the economic implications of its entry. Our analysis shows that when C2C sharing has a low transaction cost and the manufacturer’s marginal cost of production is not very high, the manufacturer will find it not optimal to offer its own rental services to consumers. In contrast, when the transaction cost for C2C sharing is high or the manufacturer’s marginal cost of production is high, the manufacturer should offer enough units of the products for rental to squeeze out C2C sharing (in expectation). When the transaction cost for C2C sharing and the manufacturer’s marginal cost are both in the middle ranges, the manufacturer’s rental services and the C2C sharing will coexist, in which case the manufacturer’s entry in the product-sharing market may reduce the total number of units of the product in the whole market but increase the consumer surplus and the social welfare.
查勇，中國科學技術大學副教授、博導。主要研究方向是供應鏈管理與運營管理，研究興趣包括跨界合作、消費者行為、供應鏈金融、Learning、數據包絡分析等。主持國家自然科學基金面上/青年4項国民娱乐，在Naval Research Logistics (NRL)、EJOR、JORS等國際主流期刊發表論文30多篇国民娱乐。
報告內容簡介（Abstract）：This paper presents a model for designing a trade credit contract between a supplier and a retailer that would coordinate a supply chain in the presence of investment opportunity for the retailer. Specifically, we study a newsvendor model where the supplier offers a trade credit contract to the retailer who, by delaying the payment, can invest the accounts payable amount and earn returns. We find that when the channel partners have symmetric information about the retailer’s investment return, a conditionally concessional trade credit (CTC) contract, which includes a wholesale price, an interest-free period, and a minimum order requirement, can achieve channel coordination. We then extend the model to the information asymmetry setting in which the retailer’s investment return is unobservable by the supplier. We show that, although the CTC contract cannot achieve the coordination in this setting, it can effectively improve channel efficiency as well as profitability for individual partners.